Matt Emmerton wrote on Thu, Dec 29, 2005 at 10:09:03PM -0500: > > Sean Bryant wrote: > > > Barney Wolff wrote: > > > > > >> On Thu, Dec 29, 2005 at 07:33:38PM -0500, Martin Cracauer wrote: > > >> > > >> > > >>> I'm a bit rusty, so please point me to style mistakes in the appended > > >>> diff. > > >>> The following diff implements a "-O" option to fetch(1), which, when > > >>> set, will make fetch use a local filename supplied by the server in a > > >>> Content-Disposition header. > > >>> > > >> > > >> Have you considered the security implications of this option? > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > Its just an extra option. I'm sure the details could be summed up in the > > > man page. > > > > I think what Barney means is that if you run fetch(1) as root and the > > server returns the filename as "/sbin/init" bad things will happen. > > The data returned in Content-Disposition should be used with caution. > > Would checking to see if the target file exists, and if so, abort the > operation and display a warning be sufficient to address the security > issues? Of course, we'd need some kind of "force" option to override this > for the foot-shooting folks, and -f is already taken, but that could easily > be documented as a "limitation" of this option. I don't like it since it derives too much from standard behavior which is to use a local name derived from the URL, even if it exists. Also, not overwriting files doesn't cut it for security, you could e.g. create a nonexisting .rhosts or .ssh/authorized_keys or play similar games. Forbidding "/" will set the security to the same level as the base functionality. I like that. Martin -- %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% Martin Cracauer <cracauer_at_cons.org> http://www.cons.org/cracauer/ FreeBSD - where you want to go, today. http://www.freebsd.org/Received on Fri Dec 30 2005 - 02:15:07 UTC
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