On Thu, Dec 29, 2005 at 10:04:03PM -0500, Martin Cracauer wrote: > > The security implications are about the same as for the base > functionality. Any filename in the current directory can be wiped out > if you fetch or wget and a URL redirects to another URL which leads to > a filename that matches. If fetch uses a redirected name as its local filename it is seriously broken and must be fixed. The manpage does not mention it. > The default behavior already *is* that the sending server has control > over your local naming. What does the security officer have to say about that, if true? > I will forbit "/" to appear in the suggested filename, though. Remember that the check must be made after any decoding of %xx et al. But no check will save the gullible from creating .shosts in $HOME or overwriting .profile . That's why I believe the whole thing is a bad idea. -- Barney Wolff http://www.databus.com/bwresume.pdf I never met a computer I didn't like.Received on Fri Dec 30 2005 - 04:39:20 UTC
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