On Fri, 06 Jun 2008 09:23:24 -0400 Coleman Kane <cokane_at_cokane.org> mentioned: > What about using the API in priv(9) or similar, such as is done in the > mlock(2)/munlock(2) code in sys/vm/vm_mmap.c ? > This is really a good idea. I've added a bunch of priv checks to cpuctl code, namely PRIV_CPUCTL_RDMSR, PRIV_CPUCTL_WRMSR and PRIV_CPUCTL_UPDATE. Names are self-describing. CPUID ioctl doesn't need that check as this operation are entirely safe and doesn't disclose any sensitive information. In fact it might be even performed from userland if one will find a way to bind the process to a specific cpu. On Fri, 6 Jun 2008 09:14:13 +1000 Peter Jeremy <peterjeremy_at_optushome.com.au> mentioned: > ENOSYS generally means "system call not implemented". You need a response > implying that the requested operation isn't supported on the hardware. > IMHO, ENODEV comes closest to that. > Yeah, it seems that ENODEV is a better choice. > I also agree with phk_at_ that serious thought needs to be given to the > foot-shooting capability offered by this patch before it is implemented. > Maybe add a sysctl to enable the write (at least) functionality - eg > hw.cpuctl.wrmsr_enable and hw.cpuctl.update_enable (both defaulting to > disabled). This at least adds a safety catch. I'm not sure if RDMSR > is dangerous - if so, possibly there should be an enable for it as well. I don't think that extra anti foot-shooting checks are needed: you can't easily fire up your system via ioctl(2) interface. At least, a little programming exercise is required. What's regarding microcode updates - there's a lot of checks if the microcode image valid in update utility, also the cpu itself checks the microcode CRC before applying update. The latest version of the patch against recent HEAD is available at ftp://ftp.SpringDaemons.com/dustheap/cpuctl.3.diff Thanks! -- Stanislav Sedov ST4096-RIPE
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