On Mon, Jun 16, 2008 at 5:44 PM, Stanislav Sedov <stas_at_freebsd.org> wrote: > On Sun, 15 Jun 2008 15:26:39 -0400 > Coleman Kane <cokane_at_FreeBSD.org> mentioned: > >> I think the anti-foot-shooting measures referred to above were also >> taking into consideration for security reasons. It might be valuable for >> someone to be able to configure this feature to be rdmsr-only, thereby >> limiting potential harm vectors in the event that an attacker is likely >> to crack access to the system for supervisory privileges. This would be >> a legitimate consideration to make, especially so that the module could >> at least provide a sane "safe operating mode" to those that would >> benefit from read-only access. >> >> So, for example, I would consider most crackers to be skilled enough to >> inject an ioctl call somewhere, even if the primary user of the system >> is not so skilled., but they want to use software written by others that >> makes use of this interface. > > On the other hand, providing extra security levels via sysctl looks > slightly overkill to me, as if the attacker would be able to issue > a ioctl call somewhere it would be easy to him to make a sysctl > call as well. Priv(9) checks and/or securelevels could be used > to limit the usage of this functionality. Furthermore, there're > a lot of other possible ways to execure an msr instructions, > including loading your own simple kernel object. There's no security issue here. If the system administrator is concerned about "security" of cpuctl, he/she just has to compile-out cpuctl or remove the module from the file system. Regards, -- Rui PauloReceived on Mon Jun 16 2008 - 16:10:18 UTC
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