Martin Cracauer wrote: > Diff on > http:/www.cons.org/tmp/freebsd-fetch-O2.diff > > When discussing, keep in mind that the user has to explicity give the > -O option (there is no environment variable to permanently turn this > on) and that the implications of the -O options are very clear and > simple. And that the main use of this is for folks who have to go > through a gazillion of Bugzilla attachments all name > "customer-errlog.20051220" etc, and there is no other way to download > them in a name-preserving manner than interactively opening them in > Mozilla and saving them. > > Before we randomize the list even more I would say I'd like to hear > from the security officer if there is concern left. Ask and ye shall receive. :-) I must say that I still have some concerns about this. In general, creating a file with a server-specified name is a very easy way to open up security problems; aside from the already-mentioned problems of overwriting important system files or creating dot-files, I can very easily imagine a script which calls fetch(1) being in the current directory and being overwritten maliciously. I also wonder why having an option for fetch(1) to create files with server-specified names is necessary. It seems to me that the best way to provide the functionality you want is to add a "-H headername" option which instructs fetch(1) to print out the value (if any) of the "headername" HTTP header. Then you could have a script download the file you want to a safe location, look at the Content-Disposition header, sanity-check it, and rename the file as appropriate. Colin PercivalReceived on Fri Dec 30 2005 - 17:48:44 UTC
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.4.0 : Wed May 19 2021 - 11:38:50 UTC